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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRENT 'W BROWN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. 1 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, ) 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 890293-CA 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this Writ of Certiorari are identified in the 
caption of this case. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was issued August 
31, 1990 and remitted October 4, 1990. Judge Russell W. Bench 
authored the opinion and Judge Richard C. Davidson and Gregory K. 
Orme concurred. A copy of the opinion is included in the 
addendum attached to this brief. 
The only issue raised by Geraldine Brown in her Writ of 
Certiorari is the adequacy of the award of attorney fees at the 
trial level and reversal of the award of attorney fees at the 
appellate court level. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced by Decree 
of Divorce on March 28, 1986. (Record 50-2.) 
2. The decree valued and divided property owned by the 
parties. Paragraph 11 of the trial court's findings made at the 
time of the decree states: 
That the parties have acquired the following 
property during their marriage: Home in 
North Logan, $275,000; six acres in North 
Logan, $95,000, subject to an approximately 
$10,000 liability for bringing utility and 
irrigation systems to the property previously 
sold to Dr. Hawkes; one-seventh interest in 
four acres at 18th North in Logan; one-fourth 
interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000; 
one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake metal 
building; $25,000; two percent interest in 29 
acres Temple View, Salt Lake City, $20,000; 
hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick Park 
Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500; 
1981 Buick Riviera, $6,000; 1983 19 foot 
power boat, $10,000; 1979 aircraft, $80,000; 
1985 Ford 1210 tractor and accessories, 
$9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000; 
profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; 
one-half interest in BH Leasing, $20,000; 
silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home in 
North Logan, $25,000; personal property with 
[Brent Brown], $3,500; furnishings in [Brent 
Brown's] apartment, $2,390; severance pay 
from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax 
refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and 
costs of preparation, approximately $2,200; 
IRA accounts with $6,372 in [Brent Brown's] 
name and $4,840 in [Geraldine Brown's] name; 
Merrill Lynch accounts, $191,679.69; and 
North Park Bank stock, no value. That 
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the home, 
valued at $275,000, the Buick Century, Buick 
Riviera, and the Ford tractor and 
accessories, valued at $19,800; and the 
furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and 
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the North Park Bank stock of no value/ and 
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the 
balance of the property except for the Brae 
severance pay which should be split between 
the parties, the net income tax refund, which 
should be split between the parties, and each 
party should be awarded their IRA accounts 
with [Brent Brown] paying to [Geraldine 
Brown] $766 for the difference. [Geraldine 
Brown] should be awarded $108,016.13 of the 
$191,679.69 of the Merrill Lynch account for 
56.352 percent of the said fund. 
3. Subsequent to the divorce, one of the three children 
reached the age of majority. At the time of the modification 
hearing, two children were minors: A son, 13, and a daughter, 7. 
(Transcript, page 17, lines 21-25/ page 18, lines 1-6). 
4. Subsequent to the divorce, Geraldine Brown turned the 
management of her investments to a financial planner, Aaron 
Lichfield (Transcript, page 43, lines 14-25/ page 44, page 45, 
lines 1-12/ page 58, lines 7-25/ pages 59-71), received 
approximately $10,000.00 per year from the investments 
(Transcript, page 82, lines 12-23), chose not to sell the home 
(Transcript, page 72, lines 5-21/ page 84, lines 7-25/ page 85, 
lines 1-16/ page 119, lines 16-25/ page 120-121/ page 122, lines 
1-17), in the approximately three years since the divorce took 
four college courses at Utah State University totaling 17 hours 
of credit (Transcript, page 867, lines 20-25/ pages 87-87/ page 
90, lines 9-14/ page 111, lines 13-25/ pages 112-115/ page 117, 
lines 20-25/ page 118/ page 119, lines 1-15), did not decide what 
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field to pursue in school (Transcript, page 89, lines 1-7), did 
not look for a job (Transcript, page 89, lines 8-25); page 90, 
lines 1-10/ page 109, lines 19-25/ page 110/ page 111, lines 1-
12/ page 116, lines 17-23), planned to take eight or more years 
to graduate from college (Transcript, page 90, lines 11-14). 
5. Geraldine Brown stipulated at the time of her deposition 
that except for a lack of skills, she had the ability to work. 
In response to Brent Brown's counsel's question, she and her 
counsel stated: 
Q. And in addition, aside from the 
limitations you've given, you're healthy 
and have the ability to work? 
A. Define "ability." 
Q. Well, you can go to work for 
eight hours a day. 
Mr. Jewell: We acknowledge that. 
We'll stipulate that she has the ability. 
Q. All right. 
(Deposition of Geraldine K. Brown, taken January 4, 1989, page 
58, lines 17-23.) 
6. Geraldine Brown's living expenses decreased from the 
time of the divorce decree to the time of the modification. 
Neither the original decree findings nor the modification 
findings refer specifically to the living expenses of Geraldine 
Brown. The only evidence produced on Geraldine Brown's expenses 
was testimony given by Geraldine Brown in response to Brent 
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Brown's counsel at the modification trial. In essence, Geraldine 
Brown testified her expenses at the time of the modification 
hearing were one-third less than at the time of the divorce 
trial. (Transcript, page 128, lines 7-25; page 129; page 130, 
lines 1-20.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Geraldine Brown filed her Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on or about December 14, 1987. 
2. Trial on the petition to modify was held February 28, 
1989, before the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christoffersen. 
3. Judge Christoffersen issued a Memorandum Decision on 
March 3, 1989. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is included in 
the Addendum attached to this brief. The following was decided 
by Judge Christoffersen on the attorney fee issue: 
Defendant is also asking attorney's fees 
for this. Section 30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has 
been interpreted to include actions for 
modification. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 
641. Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's 
fees is obviously much greater than that of 
the defendant, the defendant only having the 
income that she realizes from investment of 
funds she received from the divorce plus her 
child support and alimony. Defendant's 
counsel testified as to the hours and the 
necessity of the amount of hours for purpose 
of his hearing and the reasonableness of his 
hourly fee and with the figure of around 
$4,000.00 attorney's fees. However in 
checking over his Exhibit showing the amount 
of time spent, namely concerning the cost of 
the curb or gutter. The Court feels there 
are some items that were not necessary and 
has therefore reduced the attorney's fees 
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award to $3,000.00 as opposed to $4,000 plus 
costs. 
4. In the Findings of Fact signed and entered April 7, 
1989, Judge Christoffersen made the following findings as to 
attorney fees: 
Defendant's counsel testified regarding 
attorney's fees, showing the time spent, the 
hourly rate charged, and the necessity of the 
number of hours spent in light of the 
difficulty of the case. It was stipulated by 
counsel for the Plaintiff that the rate 
charged was a reasonable one and was commonly 
charged for such actions in the community. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff's ability to 
pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater 
than that of Defendant. Defendant only 
having the income that she realizes from 
investment of funds she received from the 
divorce plus her child support and alimony. 
However, in checking over the exhibit 
provided by Defendant's counsel showing the 
amount of time spent, the court feels that 
there are some items that were not necessary; 
namely, concerning the costs of curb and 
gutter, the Court, therefore, finds that a 
reasonable award of attorney's fees to 
Defendant from Plaintiff is $3,000.00, plus 
costs. 
In the Conclusions of Law, the following conclusion was 
made : 
In view of the difference in earning 
ability and actual income received by both 
parties, Defendant has sufficiently 
demonstrated the financial need for 
attorney's fees. The Court concludes that 
$3,000.00 is a reasonable amount for 
attorney's fees and that the number of hours 
spent were necessary in light of the 
difficulty of the case, the rate charged for 
attorney's fees was reasonable as stipulated 
bY opposing counsel and is commonly charged 
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for divorce actions in the community and that 
the award of attorney's fees is based on the 
need and results achieved in the case. 
The Order and Judgment awarded Geraldine Brown a $3,000 
judgment for attorney's fees against Brent Brown. A copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order 
are included in the Addendum attached to this Brief. 
5. Brent Brown appealed the case on May 4, 1989. Included 
in the issues on appeal was the judgment for attorney fees. 
6. Geraldine did not file a cross appeal. 
7. In its opinion filed August 31, 1990, and remitted 
October 4, 1990, the Court of Appeals wrote the following on the 
attorney fee judgment: 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by 
the trial court based on the difference in 
earning ability of the parties. Appellant 
argues that this was an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion in that appellee failed to 
prove that she was in financial need. 
Before a trial court may award attorney 
fees in a divorce matter, the requesting 
party must show that award of attorney fees 
is "reasonably needed by the party requesting 
the award." Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1986). In essence, appellee must show 
that she would be "unable to cover the costs 
of litigation." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court, however, erroneously 
concluded that attorney fees were warranted 
because "[p]laintiff's ability to pay 
attorney fees is obviously much greater than 
that of defendant." 
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In support of the trial court's 
conclusion, appellee cites Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) for the proposition that disparity 
between the parties' abilities to pay is a 
sufficient ground upon which to find need. 
We note, however, that in Andersen the 
"plaintiff testified that she had no means 
with which to pay her fees." Id. at 48 0 
(emphasis added). Appellee, on the other 
hand, has significant means with which to pay 
her fees. Cf^ Huck, 734 P.2d at 420 
(granting of attorney fees when party had no 
"liquid assets"). 
In light of appellee's significant 
assets, we find that she failed to meet her 
burden of proof that she reasonably needed 
the award. We therefore vacate the trial 
court's award of attorney fees. No cost or 
fees awarded on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRIATE 
IN THIS CASE. 
Geraldine Brown seeks review of the Court of Appeals 
decision to reverse the trial court's attorney fee award. 
However, before a writ of certiorari may be granted, Rule 4 6 Utah 
R. App. P. requires that there be some "special and important 
reasons" shown. Geraldine Brown has shown no "special and 
important reasons" and, in fact, made no reference to Rule 4 6 in 
her Petition. 
Rule 4 6 provides: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
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and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the Court 
of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict with 
a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal, 
state, or federal law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
The purpose of Rule 4 6 is to restrict Supreme Court review 
of Court of Appeal decisions to those cases where substantial 
issues of law exist or serious error has occurred. See Mast v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138 
(1984). Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
the Oregon Supreme Court helped clarify the role of a Supreme 
Court in reviewing Court of Appeals decisions. In 1000 Friends 
of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc., 584 P.2d 1371, 
1372 (Ore. 1978), the Court held that: 
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[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no 
longer to afford every losing litigant a 
forum to review errors said to have been 
committed at trial or in an administrative 
hearing. That function is now placed in the 
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party 
asserting that the Court of Appeals, in turn, 
has erred cannot for that reason alone expect 
further review in this court. The process 
must stop somewhere, and for most purposes 
this is at the first level of appeal. 
In her Petition, Geraldine Brown did not make any showing 
that the Court of Appeals decision in this case was "in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law," was "in conflict with a decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court", departed from proper judicial procedures, or 
involved an area of unsettled law best left to the Supreme Court 
to decide. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals carefully 
and correctly stated the rule of law regarding awards of attorney 
fees in divorce actions. Citing Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1986), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980), 
both of which are Utah Supreme Court decisions, the Court of 
Appeals pointed out the requirement that the requesting party 
show an attorney fee award is "reasonably needed" and that the 
party is "unable" to pay the fees. Given Geraldine Brown's 
substantial assets, no need for an award of attorney fees could 
be shown by Geraldine Brown at trial. The Court of Appeals 
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decision correctly applied the rule of law established by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
Having failed to show any "special and important reasons" 
for this Court to review this case, Geraldine Brown's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
POINT II 
REVERSAL OF THE ATTORNEY FEE JUDGMENT WAS THE 
CORRECT DECISION IN THIS CASE. 
Preliminary to an award of attorney fees, the trial court 
must make a finding of need. As quoted in Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated in Huck 
v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986): "In divorce cases, an 
award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is 
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by the party 
requesting the award." The trial court made no finding of need 
in this case. 
The trial court focused on Brent Brown's income being 
greater than that of Geraldine Brown. Geraldine Brown focused 
only on Brent Brown's income. The trial court made no finding of 
need. In fact, Geraldine Brown presented no evidence of a 
reasonable need or an inability to pay her attorney fees. Though 
the Court recognized in its memorandum decision that Geraldine 
Brown received income from the assets and support awarded in the 
decree of divorce, the Court did not address the home, which had 
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substantial value, Geraldine Brown's ability to earn income, 
Geraldine Brown's decrease in expenses, or otherwise address or 
determine Geraldine Brown's need or inability to pay her own 
fees. 
Where Geraldine Brown's resources were sufficient for her to 
pay her own attorney fees, Geraldine Brown failed to show a 
reasonable need or inability to pay her own fees, and the Court 
failed to make specific findings showing a need on the part of 
Geraldine Brown, the Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial 
court's award of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Geraldine Brown's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
denied. 
Dated this 5 day of Qctolwrr, 1990. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
W. HILLYAR^ 
'Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI were 
mailed, postpaid, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for 
Defendant/Respondent, at 15 South Main, Third Floor, First 
Security Bank Building, Logan, Utah 84321, this b day of 
Oatmbur, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, filed February 6, 1989 . . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, filed 
February 7, 198 9 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT, filed April 7, 1989 . . . . 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION, filed August 31, 1990, 
remitted October 4, 1990 
A-l 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT "W" BROWN, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
v. 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, 
Defendant 
, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 Civil No. 24569 
The parties were divorced in March of 1986, The Plaintiff 
prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Intergrated 
Systems Engineering which he later sold and was taken on as an 
employee by the purchaser. Testimony indicated that the year 
prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income 
was $100,000.00+ annually. At the time of the divorce, his inccr,,. 
was zero having terminated any employment. At that time, based 
on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated thai: he was 
not going^ to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the 
ability to generate income. 
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of 
$54,000.00 minimum. An alimony order of $200.00 per month was 
granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child 
support for three children. It was estimated that he would soon be 
making again substantial monies was correct and was a conservative 
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce 
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own 
•personal financial statement submitted to a bank in September, 
A-2 
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1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual 
income of $130,000.00 per year. 
The defendant has filed a Petition based on this change or 
circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony. 
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated 
from the September 1988 Financial Statement he submitted to the 
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per mor .\ 
as only $6,000.00. The Court recognizes that financial statements 
submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated ar.d 
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions 
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween. 
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial 
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not 
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his 
divorce was in the $100,000.00+ category annually and no income at 
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the 
$130,000.00 range at least so reflected on the statements c.*bmittc5 
to the bank last September. 
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons for the 
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 1938 and his new 
present financial declaration. Mainly being the type of business 
he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity 
of decreasing his own income monthly because of the business 
problems. He eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks 
wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend incci.o. Z1 
Brown v. Brown 
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this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of ccurs: 
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case. 
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which 
is his Exhibit 4, is more conservative than his actual income. 
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of 
September 19 88 which is defendant's Exhibit 3 is probably inflated. 
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because 
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the 
plaintiff in his business that he now solely cv/ns but will j.se Lhe 
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commission 
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month pe:: 
child as the modified order on child support payments. The Court 
feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income. 
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased 
ability to provide the standard of living that is now compatabie wi'ch 
his income taking into account those factors listed in the English 
case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking into account 
to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living 
at this time as was available before and an ability at the present 
time to pay and the needs of the defendant. The Court will therefor* 
increase the alimony award to $500.00 per month. 
Defendant is also asking attorney!s fees for this. Section 
30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions for 
A-4 
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Modification. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2nd 641. Plaintiff's 
ability to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than 
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that 
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorce 
plus her child support and alimony. Defendant's counsel testified 
as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for 
purpose of his hearing and the reasonableness of his hourly fee 
-and with the figure of around $4,000.00 attorney's fees. However 
in checking over his Exhibit showing the amount of time spent, 
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter. The Court feels 
there are some items that were not necessary and has therefore 
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000.00 as opposed to 
$4,000.00 plus costs. 
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modification 
order. 
Dated this Q} day of March, 1989. 
Stephen W. Jewell, 3814 
Attorney at Lav 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
First. Security Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT •*• BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALDIME K\ BROWH, 
Defendant-
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 24569 
This matter came on hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989, 
and again on February 23, 1989- Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell* Plaintiff was 
present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989. The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now finds 
and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
lm The parties were divorced on or about March 1&, 
1986. 
2. Prior to the divorcer Plaintiff was a partner in a 
company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later 
sold and was taken on as an employee by the purchaser. 
?4um^GL 
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3* Prior to the divorce, Plaintiff's income vas in 
excess ol $100,000.00. 
4» At the time ol the divorce, Plaintiff's income vas 
zero, having terminated any employment. 
5. At the time ol the divorce, based on Plaintiff's 
ability to generate income, the Court estimated an income lor 
Plaintill ol at least historically $54,000.00 minimum. An 
alimony order ol £200.00 per month vas granted based on that 
projection and S300.00 per month lor child support lor three 
(3) children vas ordered. 
6. The year lolloving the divorce, or in or about 
December 1986, Plaintill purchased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING himsell and currently is the sole owner ol 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. 
7. Plaintiff's net vorth as ol September 1988, vas 
approximately SI,157,000.GO. 
8. Although Plaintill represented on a financial 
statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15, 
1988, that his annual income vas $130,000.00 per year, 
Plaintall testilied at trial that his annual income vas 
actually only $72,000.00. The court recognizes that financial 
statements submitted to banks lor purposes ol loans are 
probably inllated and that financial statements submitted to 
the Court in divorce actions are probably dellated and that 
Plaintiff's income is somevhere in betveen those tvo figures. 
The court, hovever, declines to establish an exact income 
figure. 
9. It does not appear simply to be coincidental that 
Plaintiff's income the year before his divorce was in the 
$100,000.00 plus range annually and no income at the time of 
the divorce, and then two years later his income is again in 
the $130,000.00 range, or at least &o reflected on the 
statement submitted to the bank in September of 1988. 
10. The Court finds that in ^ny event there is a 
substantial and material change of circumstances in that 
Defendant's income has increased substantially from the time 
of the divorce, sufficient to warrant a modification of the 
decree and to grant Defendant's Petition. 
11. The child support as previously ordered of $200.00 
p&r month p^r- child shall be modified and increased so that 
Plaintiff shall pay $700.00 p&r month p&r child for child 
support payments. 
12. Although the Court is not specifically following 
the established child support, guidelines, the Court feels this 
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from where Plaintiff receives 
his income. 
13. After taking into account as factors on alimony. 
Plaintiff's increased ability to provide the standard of 
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into 
account those factors listed in the ENGLISH case, the JONES 
case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's 
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same standard of 
living at. this time as was availably at the time of the 
divorce and an ability at the present time for Plaintiff to 
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provide support* the needs of Defendant, and the ability of 
Defendant to provide her own support, the Court will, 
therefore, modify the Decree and increase the alimony avard 
from $200-00 per month to $500.00 p&r month. 
14. The Court finds that the £4,000.00 paid by 
Defendant for curb and gutter BBB&BBm&nt.B are the obligation 
of the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the 
obligation of Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant's counsel testified regarding attorney's 
IB&BP showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the 
necessity of the number of hours spent in light of the 
difficulty of the case. It was stipulated by counsel for the 
Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable one and was 
commonly charged lor such actions in the community. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's 1B€*B is 
obviously much greater than that of Defendant, Defendant only 
having the income that she realizes from investment of funds 
she received from the divorce plus her child support and 
alimony. However, in checking over the exhibit provided by 
Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent, the 
court IB^IS that there are some items that were not necessary; 
namely, concerning the costs of curb and gutter, the Court, 
therefore, finds that a reasonable award o± attorney's IB&B to 
Defendant from Plaintiff is $3,000.00, plus costs. 
16. There having been no evidence regarding Plaintiff's 
Counterpetition, and a Motion to Dismiss the Counter-petition 
having been made by D&i&ndBn-t^ s counsel at the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case and chief, and Plaintiff indicating his 
4 
intent to withdraw his Counterpetition, the Court finds that 
the Counterpetition should be dismissed* 
17. The Court incorporates herein by reference such 
other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1989. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide 
child support, and alimony from the time of the decree, and 
that said substantial and material change is sufficient to 
warrant a modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in 
this matter* 
2. In view of the substantial and material change in 
circumstances, the court concludes that Defendant's Petition 
to Modify as to child support and alimony should be granted 
and that child support should be increased to $700.00 p&r 
month p&T child and that, alimony should be increased to 
$500.00 p&r month. 
3. The Court further concludes $4,000*00 paid by 
Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of 
Defendant as the owner of the property and, therefore, the 
obligation of the Defendant. Defendant's Petition as to said 
curb and gutter assessment should not be granted. 
4. In veiw of the dl±l^r&nc.B in earning ability and 
actual income received by both parties, Defendant has 
A 
sufficiently demonstrated the financial need for attorney's 
fees. The court concludes that S3,000.00 as a reasonable 
amount for attorney's fees and that the number of hours spent 
were necessary in light of the difficulty of the case, the 
rate charged for attorney's fees vas reasonable as stipulated 
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged for divorce 
actions in the community and that the award of attorney's fees 
is based on the ne^&d and results acheived in the case. 
5. Plaintiff's Counterpetition should be dismissed. 
6. The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall 
be effective as of January 17, 1989. 
7. The Court incorporates herein by r&±&r&nc& such 
other conclusions of law as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1989. 
DATED this \ day of Haxc^i, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ / 
/ // 
VeNoy Chri&±.a±±E>rs&ri 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 
3Q.^ day of March, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motice to the foregoing 
persons, postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the United 
States Mail* 
Richard B* Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orera, UT 84058 
Brent W. Brown 
1622 East 1080 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
NOTICE 
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the 
Court• 
DATED this^T-T^' day of March, 1989. 
7 
A-12 
Stephen W. Jewell, 3814 
Attorney for Defendant 
15 South Hain, Third Floor 
First Security Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT * W BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALDINE K- BROWN, 
Defendant-
This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989, 
and again on February 28, 1989. Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W„ Jewell. Plaintiff was 
present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989. The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now makes the following Order and Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The First Cause of Action and Second Cause of 
Action in Defendant's Petition to rtodify Decree of Divorce, 
regarding child support and alimony respectively, shall be and 
are hereby granted. Number 7^ ^ , N'J ^ 09•'__ 
FiLED RLf=G 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 24569 
2. It is ordered that child support shall increase 
from $300.00 to $700.00 p&r month pe^r child* 
3. It is further ordered "that alimony shall increase 
from $200.00 to $500.00 p€>r month. 
4. Said modified child support, and alimony payments 
shall be paid effective as of January 17, 1989, and Defendant 
is granted a judgment against. Plaintiff for all amounts oving 
from that date -to "the date of this order. 
5. The Third and Four*th Causes of Action in 
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce regarding 
road assessments and withholding of child support and punitive 
damages shall be and are hereby denied. 
6. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded a judgment 
against Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,000.00. 
7. All other provisions of the De^ar&& entered 
previously in this action shall remain as stated. 
8* Plaintiff's Counter-Petition is denied and the same 
shall be and is hereby dismissed. 
JLfLMJL DATED t h i s _ J 3 day o f l&afeah, 1 9 8 9 . 
BY THE COURT,: 
/I 
VeNoy Chmsto^fei^sen 
D i s t r i c t : Judg£ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 1~-X„y_ day of March, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and 
Judgment and Notice to the foregoing p&r&anB* postage pre-paid 
thereon, by depositing in the United States Mail* 
Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Lav 
1327 South aOO East, Suite 300 
Orera, UT 84058 
Brent W. Broun 
1622 East 1080 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
J^jJ±±x}J* 
NOTICE 
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code oi Judicial Administration, 
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the 
Court. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS flUtf'SI 1°?0 
%%A " ooOoo 
Brent W. Brown, ) , a*;\c:**i"-%^ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Geraldine K. Brown, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890293-CA 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable VeNoy Christofferson 
Attorneys: Lyle W. Hillyard, Logan, for Appellant 
Stephen W. Jewell, Logan, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant Brent W. Brown appeals an order that modified 
his decree of divorce by increasing the amount of alimony and 
child support payments he is to pay to appellee. Appellant 
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing 
alimony and child support payments when (1) the appellee failed 
to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in 
circumstances necessitating the increase, (2) the appellee 
produced no evidence of a necessity for the increases or of her 
inability to aid in her own and the children1 s support, and (3) 
the trial court made no findings regarding necessity and 
ability. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
It is reversible error if a trial court fails to make 
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record 
are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983). These findings "should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
A 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached.- Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)), 
The trial court's findings in the present case do not include 
sufficient detail for us to determine what steps it took in 
reaching its conclusions as to the material issues that must be 
considered prior to modifying a divorce decree. In fact, the 
findings are so sparse we do not know if the material issues 
were even considered. 
"The threshold requirement for relief [in a petition to 
modify a divorce decree] is a showing of a substantial change 
of circumstances occurring since the entry of the*, decree and 
not contemplated in the decree itself." Navlor v. Navlor, 700 
P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). In the present case, the trial 
court failed to make any specific findings on appellant's 
ability to pay, which is the alleged substantial change in 
circumstances. In particular, the trial court's determination 
that appellant's income was somewhere within -a very broad range 
was insufficient to establish appellant's income—a critical 
factor in determining the larger question of his ability to 
pay. Because we do not know the factual basis for the trial 
court's conclusion that a substantial change in circumstances 
had occurred, we cannot determine whether appellee met her 
burden of proving this threshold requirement. Nor can we 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in so 
finding. 
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider each 
of the following three factors: "(1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support." Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 
124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In the present case the trial court 
failed to make specific findings concerning any of these 
factors. In particular, the trial court made no findings as to 
appellee's ability to work. See, e.g., Hialev v. Hicrlev, 676 
P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). The record is also "void of any 
facts as to [appellant's] or [appellee's] monthly expenses 
which are relevant both to [appellee's] 'need* and 
[appellant's] ability to pay." Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 125. 
Again, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's 
order increasing alimony was within its discretion because we 
do not know upon what factual basis it rests. 
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In determining child support the trial court must 
consider the following factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7(2) (1987): 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of 
others. 
Failure to consider these statutory factors is an abuse of 
discretion. Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43-44 
(Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in the present case has not 
indicated that it considered any of these statutory factors. 
We are therefore precluded from reviewing the merits of its 
award. 
The trial court failed to make adequate factual findings 
concerning the substantial change in circumstances and the 
other material factors identified above. Inasmuch as the 
record is not clear and uncontroverted and capable of only 
supporting the t^ rial court's award of increased alimony and 
child support^ we"vacate the trial court's order and remand for 
further proceedings to take additional evidence on these 
factors^ as needed/ and for entry of findings concerning each 
factor identified above and any other material factor which may 
arise. While we do not approve or disapprove of the amounts 
awarded by the trial court/ we do caution that M[w]e do not 
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and 
supporting the conclusion already reached.* Allred v. Allred, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14/ 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by the trial court 
based on the difference in earning ability of the parties. 
Appellant argues that this was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in that appellee failed to prove that she was in 
financial need. 
Before a trial court may award attorney fees in a divorce 
raatter# the requesting party must show that award of attorney 
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fees is Hreasonably needed by the party requesting the award." 
Huck v, Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)• In essence, 
appellee must show that she would be Hunable to cover the costs 
of litigation,H Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court, however, erroneously concluded that 
attorney fees were warranted because "[p]laintiff«s ability to 
pay attorney fees is obviously much greater than that of 
defendant." 
In support of the trial court's conclusion, appellee 
cites Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) for the proposition that disparity between the parties' 
abilities to pay is a sufficient ground upon which to find 
need. We note, however, that in Andersen the -plaintiff 
testified that she had n& means with which to pay her fees." 
Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Appellee, on the other hand, has 
significant means with which to pay her fees. ££• Huck, 734 
P.2d at 420 (granting of attorney fees when party had no 
-liquid assets"). 
In light of appellee's significant assets, we find that 
she failed to meet her burden of proof that she reasonably 
needed the award. We therefore vacate the trial court's award 
of attorney fees. No cost or fees awarded on appeal. 
Hussell W. Bench, Judge-
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregor^^. Orrae, Judge 
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